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"Pray, Madam, are you a federalist?": 
Women's Rights and the Republican 
Utopia of Alcuin 
Anita M. Vickers 
Written during the waning years of the eighteenth century, Charles Brockden 
Brown's dialogue Alcuin (1798) provides insight into the intellectual and politi-
cal controversy that surrounded the "woman question" in the new republic. 
Provocatively modern in tone, the work addresses the contentious issues of 
women's moral "superiority," their education, the barriers that precluded their 
entering certain professions, and their lack of legal rights and political voice, as 
well as the nature of marriage and the viability of divorce. Ultimately, Alcuin 
provides a vehicle for Brown's emphatic support for women's rights within a 
republican society. 
Structured as an ongoing dialogue between Mrs. Carter, a Philadelphia 
matron, and Alcuin, a poor schoolmaster, the work reflects the critical impact of 
Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797) and William Godwin (1756-1836) on the 
development of Brown's early philosophy, especially as it related to questions of 
women's rights in the late eighteenth century. Both Wollstonecraft and Godwin 
were English radicals of the Enlightenment whose incisive social and political 
critiques were widely debated both in fashionable Continental salons and along-
side American colonial firesides. Wollstonecraft was primarily known as a 
zealous advocate of social equality and educational opportunity for women. 
Godwin, a participant in the English Romantic literary movement, was a philoso-
pher and an eminent political journalist who endorsed anarchism, personal 
freedom, and religious dissent in his writings. Brown's early Alcuin not only 
provides both an historical and political chronicle of the era but also anticipates 
some of the philosophical underpinnings, thematic concerns, and the depiction of 
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character found in the four major novels that comprised Brown's major phase: 
Wieland{\19%\ Ormond (1799), Arthur Mervyn (1799-1800), and Edgar Huntly 
(1799). 
Recent critical appraisal of Brown's work has ranged from a condemnation 
("an extremely clumsy work" [Hedges, 115] ), to a qualified endorsement ("Alcuin 
is no masterpiece. . . [but] the sum of the parts is more significant than the 
limitations of the whole" [Davidson, 75]), to outright applause ("a small master-
piece, sophisticated and occasionally witty" [Fleischmann, 7]). Regardless of 
Alcuin's aesthetic merit, it bears scrutiny because it provides mirrors to cultural 
and political debates over the roles of women in the new republic, debates that 
would be raised once again more forcefully during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. 
The fragmented publishing history of Alcuin itself mirrors the fluctuating 
political mood of the early nationalist era, one that evinces the conservative 
temper that was beginning to pervade the new republic. Not until the twentieth 
century were all four parts of the dialogue even published as a collection.1 Within 
Brown's lifetime (1771-1810) only Parts I and II—which center on the recurring 
question, "Pray, Madam, are you a federalist?," consequently evoking discus-
sions on suffrage and education for women—found a reading audience. The first 
two parts, written sometime between the winter of 1796 and the spring of 1797, 
were serialized from March 17,1798, to April 7,1798, in the Philadelphia-based 
Weekly Magazine. Although Brown's friend and biographer William Dunlap 
assessed the date of composition as late 1797 (1: 70), twentieth-century scholar-
ship has established that Parts I and II were written between the winter of 1796 
and the fall of 1797.2 
Brown's friend Dr. Elihu Hubbard Smith later had Parts I and II published 
in book form.3 Smith delivered the proofread manuscript to the New York-based 
publishing house of Thomas and James Swords in late February 1798. The 
dialogue was finally published in book form two months later and copyrighted the 
following week (1 May 1798). Although written soon afterwards,4 Parts III and 
IV were not published until five years after Brown's death in Dunlap's The Life 
of Charles Brockden Brown (1815). The reason for the publishing delay is not 
really known. Friends, notably Dunlap when he included it in the Life of Brown, 
tacitly repudiated the latter half—which foregrounds the now-visionary Alcuin's 
visit to a female Utopia, a Utopia that mirrors Godwin's concepts in Enquiry 
Concerning Political Justice and Its Influence on Morals and Happiness (1793). 
Perhaps Brown himself abandoned any further attempts to publish the final 
sections, reflecting what might be viewed as a growing conservative stance. Or 
conceivably well-meaning friends, such as Smith and Dunlap, may have deterred 
Brown from publishing what they saw as a text too radical for American tastes, 
especially in a society which was skeptical of the agendas of Wollstonecraft and 
Godwin.5 
Mary Wollstonecraft's A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792) is a 
spirited and ardent treatise on the plight of women and their need to be afforded 
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equal rights. Like Brown's Alcuin, this work deals, in part, with the poor 
education of women and how this substandard—even frivolous—education 
enslaves them. In the introduction to the first edition, Wollstonecraft contends 
that 
women, in particular, are rendered weak and wretched by a 
variety of concurring causes, originating from one hasty con-
clusion. The conduct and manners of women, in fact, evidently 
prove that their minds are not in a healthy state [sjtrength 
and usefulness are sacrificed to beauty.... One cause of this 
[state] I attribute to a false system of education, gathered from 
the books written on this subject by men who, considering 
females rather as women than human creatures, have been 
more anxious to make them alluring mistresses than affection-
ate wives and rational mothers; and the understanding of the 
sex has been so bubbled by this specious homage, that the 
civilized women of the present century, with a few exceptions, 
are only anxious to inspire love, when they ought to cherish a 
nobler ambition, and by their abilities and virtues exact respect. 
(31-32) 
Wollstonecraft specifically attacks Rousseau and writers who espouse what 
she sees as Rousseau's tyrannical anti-female philosophy. She emphatically 
argues against the Rousseauvian notion that women are inherently weak. Rather 
than being trained as "gentle, domestic brutes" (50), a woman's natural propen-
sity for trade and the professions, Wollstonecraft asserts, should be carefully 
nurtured. Accordingly, she outlines what she deems to be a rational course of 
study for the eighteenth-century woman, a curriculum that includes the study of 
literature, medicine, history, and politics. She concludes her argument with a call 
for a revolution in female manners: "Let woman share the rights and she will 
emulate the virtues of man; for she must grow more perfect when emancipated. 
.." (287). Women should be educated and trained to exist as autonomous beings 
and should not be made dependent upon marriage for economic and social 
survival. 
Godwin's own views on the role of women were even more radical than those 
of his wife. He held that any institution that limited or suppressed individual 
freedom, whether it be religious, social, or political, should be abolished.;In 
Political Justice, he dynamically contends that marriage is a law that is "the worst 
of all laws" (2: 272). Furthermore, marriage is 
an affair of property, and the worst of all properties. So long as 
two human beings are forbidden by positive institution to 
follow the dictates of their own mind, prejudice is alive and 
vigorous. So long as I seek to engross one woman to myself and 
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to prohibit my neighbour from proving his superior desert and 
reaping the fruits of it, I am guilty of the most odious of all 
monopolies. . . . As long as this state of society continues, 
philanthropy will be crossed and checked in a thousand ways, 
and the still augmenting stream of abuse will continue to flow. 
(Political Justice 2: 272-273) 
Initially, Godwin objected to the institution of marriage, one he saw as being 
oppressive and restrictive, and therefore harmful to the good of the state. 
Eventually, the radical English philosopher tempered his stand.6 Subsequent 
editions of Political Justice included monogamy in his ideal state, but this 
emendation did little to alter the conservatives' perception of his views; his 
notoriety as an anarchist and an atheist (an unsubstantiated charge) precluded any 
acceptance from conservatives, regardless of Godwin's philosophical shift. 
As a whole, the liberal thinkers and spokespersons (such as Franklin and 
Jefferson) within the new republic tended to evade Godwin's philosophy as it 
applied to women and to marriage; their rhetoric primarily centered on revolu-
tionary concepts, especially in conjunction with the French struggle and universal 
rights. Ironically, conservative Federalists focused on the women's rights issue. 
These Federalists, led by Yale President and Hartford Wit Timothy Dwight, 
became alarmed by what they saw as Godwin's advocacy of sexual licentious-
ness, of his rejection of marriage and, therefore, of the dissolution of the family, 
fearing such iconoclasm would lead to chaos. Targeting liberal thinkers as 
reprobates, conservatives like Dwight inveighed against the spread of ideas 
similar to those espoused by Godwin and Wollstonecraft. 
Wollstonecraft's ideas presented in Vindication, in particular, were viewed 
suspiciously. Many Americans perceived Vindication as a dangerous document 
that provided grounds for deism, attacked the institution of marriage, and served 
as a vehicle for promulgating the radical—and thus menacing—revolutionary 
ideas of the French. 
Parts III and IV of Alcuin were completed during a period of change and 
uncertainty, a period whose mood can be exemplified by the national furor over 
the XYZ affair (1797). (After the XYZ affair was made public in April 1798, 
public outcry over the bribe solicitation by the French agents-agents referred to 
in correspondence as "X," "Y," and "Z"—grew so vociferous that the country 
began preparing for war against France.) In addition, considerable political, 
social, and cultural turmoil had beleaguered the new republic after the adoption 
of the Constitution: xenophobia (the Alien and Sedition Acts of the summer of 
1798 that were precipitated by the XYZ affair), fiscal instability, little inherent 
unity, frontier insurrections (Shays's Rebellion, 1786-1787, and the Whiskey 
Rebellion, 1794), and, with the exception of the Continental Congress, no shared 
institutions among the states. 
Unquestionably, this political and intellectual climate had a great bearing on 
A/cwm's content—and on its censor. In this respect Alcuin is an historic anomaly. 
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Its expression of a liberal view of women's rights and the nature of marriage and 
yet the suppression (for whatever reason) of the more radical Parts III and IV 
(which portray a Godwinian feminist Utopia) reflects the tumultuous climate of 
the late 1790s. Moreover, Alcuin is a literary first because it succinctly provides 
an American discussion on the rights of women and a social/political culmination 
of this discussion because the publishing of Parts I and II and the writing of Parts 
III and IV were concurrent with the climactic debate over sexual equality 
(Davidson, 72). 
The woman question, however, had roots predating the time in which Brown 
was formulating his ideas. An earlier example of the turbulence the women's 
rights question evoked is Abigail Adams ' s request (dated 31 March 1776) that her 
husband and his compatriots should 
remember the ladies and be more generous and favorable to 
them than were your ancestors. Do not put such unlimited 
power into the hands of husbands. Remember all men would be 
tyrants if they could. If particular care and attention are not paid 
to the ladies, we are determined to foment a rebellion and will 
not hold ourselves bound to obey any laws in which we have 
no voice or representation. (Familiar Letters, 150-151) 
Despite his wife's strong language in this letter, Adams refused to consider 
seriously Abigail's argument. His jesting, yet caustic, reply (dated 14 April 1776) 
to her request fully illustrates his view and the view of his fellow conservatives— 
and even those views on the subject of such liberals as Franklin and Jefferson— 
toward women's rights in the new republic: 
As to your extraordinary Code of Laws, I cannot but laugh. We 
have been told that our struggle has loosened the bands of 
Government every where. That Children and Apprentices 
were disobedient—that schools and Colledges [sic] were grown 
turbulent—that Indians slighted their Guardians and Negroes 
grew insolent to their Masters. But your Letter was the first 
Intimation that another Tribe more numer-ous and powerfull 
than all the rest were grown discontented.... 
Depend upon it, We know better than to repeal our 
Masculine systems. . . . (Familiar Letters, 155) 
Because under the Constitution yet another masculine system was firmly 
installed, the voices of this discontented "tribe" became more vehement, their 
arguments reaching a crescendo during this crucial period in American history. 
As a result, the American popular press was inundated with treatises on both sides 
of the woman question. There was even a verse (sung to the tune of "Yankee 
Doodle") that embraced "the peaceful scene / of government petticoats" (Violette, 
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36-37). Respected early Republican women writers, such as Abigail Adams and 
essayist and playwright Mercy Otis Warren, too, added their eloquent voices to 
the controversy, but the popular ditty more than any other form demonstrates the 
widespread public fascination with the subject to which Brown responds in 
Alcuin (Arner, 279). 
Despite such lively republican interst, the woman question still had not been 
fully resolved. By 1796, two years before the first parts of Alcuin were published, 
the question of women's suffrage was put to the test when the women of New 
Jersey exercised their right to vote in the state election, which generated a furor 
in the press. (By 1807 the state legislature of New Jersey repealed the clause in 
the state constitution that had extended franchise to all inhabitants whose assets 
were fifty pounds or greater, thus "solving" the suffrage problem by excluding a 
legal loophole that might qualify a propertied woman voting rights, reaffirming, 
in my opinion, another "masculine system.") 
As an examination of the collated and complete text demonstrates, Alcuin 
reflects and illustrates the debate surrounding women's rights and the structure 
of the family during the early nationalist era, just as it provides a forum for 
examining Godwinian and Wollstonecraftian philosophy. 
For the most part, Brown's method in Alcuin is exploratory, that is his 
employment of form permits him to create a testing ground of ideas. His 
manipulation of the dialogue format and his painstaking delineation of character 
clearly lend themselves well to this exploration process. Mrs. Carter, the wise and 
prudent middle-class matron, and Alcuin, the impetuous and easily influenced 
schoolmaster, serve, respectively, as advocates of and dissenters against popular 
philosophies and assumptions about women. Moreover, Brown's dialogue for-
mat may offer tacit evidence of his own conflicting beliefs: that the sexes are 
absolutely equal ("the differences that flow from the sexual distinction are 
nothing in the balance") and that gender differences do exist as a result of class 
distinctions, individual experience, and environment, the latter belief an out-
growth of the Lockean notion of tabula rasa (Fliegelman, xix). 
Throughout the dialogue Alcuin defends the status quo and women's 
subservient roles, acknowledging the impact of situational determinism on their 
plight, whereas Mrs. Carter is more critical of her sex and the conditions that have 
molded them. Brown implements a pattern of argument—chivalry/apology 
juxtaposed against criticism—through his characters in a manner that corre-
sponds to that employed by Wollstonecraft in Vindication. The basic analogy 
used in Brown's and Wollstonecraft's works has a distinct correlation: Mrs. 
Carter postulates that American women should be entitled to full political rights 
just as Wollstonecraft affirms that women should be afforded equality by the 
French revolutionaries. 
Alcuin opens with the initial meeting of Alcuin and Mrs. Carter. Alcuin is 
disquieted by Mrs. Carter's lyceum. He is all too aware of his "unpowdered locks 
. . . worsted stockings, and... pewter buckles... embarrassed air, and... uncouth 
gait" (6: 5). His awkwardness, over-sensitivity, and insecurity compel him to 
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blurt out to his hostess one of the more astounding questions asked of an 
eighteenth-century American woman: "Pray, Madam, are you a federalist?" 
Instead of answering him, she poses her own question with a decidedly satiric 
inflection: "What! ask a woman, shallow and inexperienced as all women are 
known to be, especially with regard to these topics, her opinion on any political 
question ! What in the name of decency have we [women] to do with politics?" (6: 
7). 
Mrs. Carter's subsequent probing questions underscore the absurdity of 
Alcuin's unconventional question. Even though the talk at the lyceum is mainly 
political, a woman, even one as intelligent and politically astute as Mrs. Carter, 
would have no formal party affiliation. Because of her gender she has been 
automatically excluded from taking part in elections and in having a voice in the 
government. Later, she passionately and eloquently expands on the incongruous 
notion of a nation whose rhetoric deployed in the Declaration of Independence 
and the Constitution exhorts egalitarian and democratic ideals, but whose 
formation and enforcement of the law denies these same fundamental rights to the 
majority of its citizens: 
What have I, as a woman, to do with politics? Even the 
government to our own country, which is said to be the freest 
in the world, passes over women as if they were not. We are 
excluded from all political rights without the least ceremony. 
Law-makers thought as little of comprehending us in their code 
of liberty as if we were pigs, or sheep. (6: 22) 
Mrs. Carter ably furthers this line of argument, cataloguing all others who are 
afforded no political rights in America: men under the age of twenty-one, 
immigrants, the non-propertied, and African slaves. The litany of the politically 
subjugated persuasively illustrates the exclusions of various groups in a govern-
ment that is "the freest in the world."7 Mrs. Carter's analogy between women and 
livestock (strongly implying that women are no more than property) reveals her 
anger at being so easily dismissed by the Framers. Perhaps Alcuin proffers 
another of the novelist's harrowing predictions: the nation's denial of universal 
suffrage and equal rights to half of its citizenry will lead to its dissolution. Such 
an implied proposition echoes Abigail Adams's caveat to her husband twenty-
two years earlier: "we are determined to foment a rebellion, and will not hold 
ourselves bound to obey any laws in which we have no voice or representation" 
(151). 
The dearth of legal and political rights for women in Federalist America is 
most decidedly the locus of Mrs. Carter's speech. Alcuin's unusual question, 
elicited by an ensuing discussion of the policies of French Revolutionary Carnot 
and the arch-Federalist Peter Porcupine (a ferocious Francophobe) and couched 
within the immediate context of the Federalist/Anti-Federalist debate, thus can be 
read two ways.8 First, the schoolteacher may be asking whether she is opposed to 
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the pro-French views of the Republicans. (This was a period of strained relations 
between the Adams Administration and Republican France, which culminated in 
the revelation of the XYZ affair and the subsequent passage of the Alien and 
Sedition Acts.) Or, he may be inquiring whether she ascribes to the arguments of 
the Anti-Federalists, who were displeased with what they saw as the conservative 
slant of the Constitution, protesting that it failed to reflect the liberalism of 1776. 
Mrs. Carter's eventual reply, however, encapsulates the latter issue: 
If they [politicians] generously admit me into the class of 
existences, but affirm that I exist for no purpose but the 
convenience of the more dignified sex, that I cannot be en-
trusted with the government of myself... it is not for me to 
smile at their tyranny, or receive as my gospel, a code built 
upon such atrocious maxims. No, I am no federalist. (6: 23) 
At this point we should ask if there is a spokesperson for Brown's views in 
the dialogue: do the characters merely function as exponents of concerns and 
philosophies that the author found intriguing but were not necessarily his own? 
Since much of the work is really a discussion of opposing viewpoints, with one 
character dominating the dialogue, this is highly unlikely. 
Who then is the spokesperson? The visionary schoolmaster or the mistress 
of the tea table? Brown's unequivocal preference to identify the schoolteacher 
with Charlemagne's court philosopher (and, consequently, his titling of the 
dialogue) at first appears to suggest his alliance with the former. But Brown 
presents Mrs. Carter, not the schoolteacher, as having the most formidable 
intellect and soundest logic, strongly indicating that she is the spokesperson. Mrs. 
Carter, not the titular character, dominates the dialogue. The schoolteacher is 
subordinated, becoming her willing pupil. She becomes his teacher, instructing 
and testing him throughout all four parts. Although her life is defined by the 
statement "she was always at home," she is more than the stereotypical middle-
class matron. 
Brown's decision to use a middle-class woman, instead of an aristocratic 
woman—or an impoverished schoolmaster—as his spokesperson obliquely 
echoes Wollstonecraft's concerns. In Vindication, Wollstonecraft contrasts the 
roles of aristocratic women ("fine ladies") with their middle-class counterparts 
("notable women"): 
The latter [notable women] are often friendly, honest crea-
tures, and have a shrewd kind of good sense joined with 
worldly prudence, that often render them more useful members 
of society than the fine sentimental lady . . . . (112) 
Clearly Mrs. Carter is distinguished by her "shrewd kind of good sense" and 
"worldly prudence." She appears to be the woman who is the primary audience 
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for Wollstonecraft's discussion on education and political rights for women, the 
quintessential example of the notable woman Wollstonecraft describes. In the 
character of Mrs. Carter, we can see a forerunner of Brown's most admirable 
Wollstonecraftian woman, Constantia Dudley (Ormond). (Constantia, constant 
as her name implies, is courageous, intelligent, benevolent, resourceful, curious, 
and especially forgiving. She has benefited from a superb education. Her father 
has tutored her in the works of Newton and Hartley, Tacitus, and Milton. Thus she 
has received the type of education Brown advocated for women in Alcuin, one that 
would allow women to pursue "those paths which lead to usefulness and honour" 
[6: 11]). Moreover, because Mrs. Carter is depicted as a "notable woman" (as 
defined by Wollstonecraft), shrewd and prudent, we must give her discourse 
credence and precedence over Alcuin's lofty, idealistic speeches. 
In addition, Alcuin's off-hand commentary on the political discourse at the 
lyceum, "The edicts of Carnot, and the commentary of that profound jurist, Peter 
Porcupine, had furnished ample materials of discussion" (6:7; emphasis added), 
reveal the ineptitude of the schoolmaster's political acumen. Obviously mention 
of the French revolutionary and the vituperative Porcupine facilitates Brown's 
illustration of the ongoing political debate in the 1790s. Alcuin's assessment, 
however, of Porcupine as a "profound jurist" represents the schoolteacher's 
fallacious reasoning. The controversial Porcupine's fame rested upon scurrilous 
exposés and highly inflammatory tracts, hardly the record of a "profound jurist." 
His vicious opposition to Thomas Paine, the author of "An Occasional Letter on 
the Female Sex," one of the first tracts in America that specifically dealt with 
women's rights, would have been well-known by Brown's contemporary audi-
ence. The reference to Porcupine thus would circuitously imply that although 
Alcuin might not be anti-feminist, he might not be as predisposed toward 
women's rights at the outset of the dialogue as an initial reading might indicate. 
Only through Mrs. Carter's forceful dialectic does Alcuin evolve into the 
fervent—almost fanatical—Godwinian-styled feminist he becomes by the end of 
the dialogue. 
Only when Alcuin addresses the issues of education for women and their 
proper sphere does Mrs. Carter comment that "now you talk reasonably" (6: 8). 
Encouraged by her approval, Brown's rustic philosopher expands on his feminist 
beliefs: 
Women profit by their opportunities. They are trained to a 
particular art The arts of women are far from contemptible, 
whether we consider the skill that is required by them, or, 
which is a better criterion, their usefulness in society.... But 
though we may strive, we can never wholly extinguish in 
women the best principle of human nature, curiosity. (6: 8-9; 
emphasis added) 
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Women's "place" and their utility in society underscore this passage. Alcuin 
sees the traditional role of women as being far more honorable than many of the 
roles men play in society. (Soldiers and barbers bear the brunt of his scorn.) 
Furthermore, he later asserts (under Mrs. Carter's adept probing) that the sexes 
are equal, the only difference between the two being attributed to the circum-
stances under which each is subject. The interests and talents of men and women 
are evenly proportioned. 
Shrewdly, Mrs. Carter tests the sincerity of Alcuin's feminist protestations. 
In her role of interlocutor, she raises the popular contention that there are no 
female Pythagorases, Lycurguses, Socrateses, Newtons, or Lockes. To her 
satisfaction, Alcuin facilely dismisses this illogical argument, one which is 
obviously androcentrically-based: "You might as well expect a Laplander to 
write Greek spontaneously, and without instruction, as that one should be wise or 
skillfull without suitable opportunity" (6: 10).9 In other words, because women 
are not afforded the same educational and professional opportunities as men, they 
should not and cannot be expected to produce the female equivalent to, say, 
Newton. (Wollstonecraft, too, addresses the argument that there are no female 
Newtons and thus that women are inferior to men. Her answer, "that he [Newton] 
was probably a being of superior order, accidentally caged in a human body" (70), 
thus differs from the argument presented by Brown.) The faulty syllogistic 
argument in itself manifests the injustice and inequities assigned to women. 
Mrs. Carter is quick to concur with Alcuin's assessment, her voice growing 
more emphatic and strident than the schoolteacher's: "Yes . . . of all forms of 
injustice, that is the most egregious which makes the circumstance of sex a reason 
for excluding one half of mankind from all those paths which lead to usefulness 
and honour" (6:11). If we accept the proposition that Brown is filtering his own 
thoughts and agenda through the words of Mrs. Carter, then we must view this as 
a wholesale acceptance of the Lockean view of tabula rasa. Eighteenth-century 
woman is ignorant and ineffectual, not because she lacks the innate abilities of 
men, but because her worldly experience has impeded any effort to acquire 
knowledge and honor. In other words, Brown has tested one of Locke's crucial 
tenets and has validated it. (Antithetically, in Wieland he will test another 
Lockean tenet—the idea of empiricism—but in that case he will repudiate it.) 
The dialogue then moves swiftly to the prohibition of women in the 
professions, which Mrs. Carter decries. Alcuin strongly objects to Mrs. Carter's 
assertion that the plight of women—that is, their dependence upon men—would 
be ameliorated if they could be trained for and then be permitted to practice within 
a profession. His sophist argument, especially when he exalts the role of woman 
as wife, mother, and housekeeper (to whom he refers as a "household deity" [6: 
30]), ultimately exposes him. He is not the liberal thinker and budding feminist 
he purports to be. Instead, Alcuin espouses the patronizing views of the patriar-
chy. He, like the framers of the Constitution, wants to maintain what John Adams 
referred to as the "masculine system." But for the modern reader his argument, 
even though it addresses what he sees as being the moral superiority of women, 
"Pray, Madam, are you a federalist?" 99 
is weak and biased since it privileges woman's role in the home over the other 
roles in society she might play. 
The schoolteacher begins the argument by stating that women can become 
merchants and bankers: "The profession of merchant may be pursued with 
success and dignity . . . there are bankers and merchants of your [Mrs. Carter's] 
sex, to whom that consideration is attached to which they are entitled by their skill, 
their integrity, or their opulence" (6:13). His argument here is well taken, yet Mrs. 
Carter continues her series of queries: "But what apology can you make for 
exclusion from the class of physicians?" (6: 14). Here, too, Alcuin handles the 
counterpoint well: "To a certain extent the exclusion is imaginary" (6: 14), he 
claims, citing his own grandmother's remarkable medical skills as an example of 
women's substantial contribution in the medical field. 
But when Mrs. Carter raises the question of female exclusion from the law, 
Alcuin specifically cites this liberal profession as a most unsuitable profession for 
a woman, his tone harsh and unyielding: 
True, we are not accustomed to see female pleaders at the bar. 
I never wish to see them there. But the law, as a science, is open 
to their curiosity or their benevolence. It may be even practised 
as a source of gain, without obligating us to frequent and public 
exhibitions. (6: 14) 
Several critics have analyzed this short, but troublesome, passage, giving 
consideration to Brown's known antipathy toward the legal profession in general 
and integrating that information with Alcuin's desire to exclude women from the 
bar.10 Obviously, by his very rejection of the profession in which he had been 
trained, Brown came to consider the law to be an unfit profession for anyone, male 
or female, and thus his objection (and Alcuin's and, by her acquiescence, Mrs. 
Carter's objection) to the law transcends the gender issue. (In later works, notably 
Wieland [1798] and ArthurMervyn [Part 1,1799, Part II, 1800] Brown exposes 
what he saw as the ineptitude and corruption of the American legal system.) 
In a broader, all-encompassing sense, this brief allusion to the legal profes-
sion underscores the idea that Alcuin is the prototype for thematic concerns in his 
major novels. But in this specific instance, Alcuin's objection reveals that he has 
consciously—even blatantly—glorified woman's role, an over-reaction that 
attempts to mask his patriarchal leanings. But we can see how he does eventually 
acquiesce to Mrs. Carter's perspective. As litigators, he does not "wish to see 
them there [before the bar]" (6: 14). Assuredly, this would maintain their moral 
superiority over those men who engage in "legal robbery." He does, nevertheless, 
concede that they most assuredly can perform duties essential to the implemen-
tation of the law and justice: as judges and scholars. 
This is a definite movement away from the concept of the "household deity." 
By the end of Part H, there are subtle hints that Alcuin has come around to Mrs. 
Carter's way of thinking—or at least has decided to give her views more thought. 
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He ends his portion of the conversation with a short lecture on the question of 
whether women are intellectually inferior to men, citing societal constraints and 
training that perpetuate this bias: 
It may at first appear that men have generally ascribed intellec-
tual pre-eminence to themselves. Nothing, however, can be 
inferred from this. It is doubtful whether they judge rightly on 
the question of what is, or is not intrinsically excellent. Not 
seldom they have placed their superiority in that, which rightly 
understood, should have been pregnant with ignominy and 
humiliation. Should women themselves be found to concur in 
the belief that the other sex surpasses them in intelligence, it 
will avail but little. We [all humankind] must still remember 
that opinion is evidence of nothing but its own existence. This 
opinion, indeed, is peculiarly obnoxious. [T]hey merely repeat 
what they have been taught, and their teachers have been men. 
(6: 32-33) 
He now acknowledges the evils of a patriarchal system, one that subjugates 
and thus limits half of its citizenry. The first two sentences echo Wollstonecraft' s 
contention that male tyranny has promulgated, in order to enslave women, the 
false assumption that females possess weaker intellects. Since women have been 
taught by the patriarchy (never should we forget that Alcuin himself is a teacher), 
they have adopted its tenets and, in some cases, not questioned its perpetuation 
of sexism. His tone here becomes strident, tacitly endorsing Wollstonecraft's call 
for a revolution in female manners. In this speech we are able to discern a subtle 
foreshadowing of the role Alcuin will take in Parts III and IV, that of an advocate 
of a matriarchal system. 
When Alcuin returns to the lyceum a week later, he has become a Godwinian 
visionary. He explains that within the last week he has travelled to a "paradise of 
women" where there are no gender distinctions and the "two sexes mingled their 
inquiries and opinions" (6: 38). Obviously, Alcuin's visit is only a Utopian 
fantasy, the direct result of his recollection of and meditation upon his earlier 
conversation with Mrs. Carter, an attempt to imagine a society based upon the 
principles he thinks she endorses. Very likely he has also spent the time perusing 
the works of Godwin. The paradise he describes more closely follows the 
concepts outlined in Book VIII, chapters v-ix in the first edition of Political 
Justice than any notions he might have gleaned from his previous conversation 
with Mrs. Carter.11 
The remainder of the dialogue is a monologue interrupted by Mrs. Carter's 
astute questions. Alcuin describes the paradise of woman as a republican Utopia, 
where the inhabitants (male and female) dress alike and share all recreational and 
intellectual activities. In addition, this society has embraced Jeffersonian agrari-
anism, deeming it the most ennobling way of life. In Alcuin's visionary paradise 
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both men and women share in the labor and the fruits of the harvest: "The greater 
the number of those who are employed in administering to pleasure, the greater 
will be the product" (6: 48). 
True to Godwinian philosophy, the institution of marriage does not exist in 
this "paradise of women." What follows is the first extant indication that Brown, 
although fascinated by the tenets of Godwinism, had found flaws in this radical 
philosophy. Through Mrs. Carter the novelist seizes on an opportunity to reprove 
Godwin and his followers: 
A class of reasoners has lately arisen, who aim at the deepest 
foundation of civil society. Their addresses to the understand-
ing have been urged with no despicable skill. But this was 
insufficient. It was necessary to subdue our incredulity, as to 
the effects of their new maxims, by exhibiting those effects in 
detail, and winning our assent to their truth by engrossing the 
fancy and charming the affections. (6: 52) 
She unstintingly condemns Godwin's advocacy of cohabitation, claiming 
that cohabitation shatters the self-esteem, devotion, freedom, character, and 
conviction of its partners. In what first appears to be a retraction of views 
expressed in Parts I and II (where she had equated marriage with slavery), Mrs. 
Carter now maintains that the institution of marriage is necessary and sacred. But 
this is not a retraction; it is a clarification. It is not the institution to which she most 
strenuously objects. Rather, she objects to the legal ramifications associated with 
marriage: 
Marriage is a sacred institution, but it would argue the most 
pitiful stupidity to imagine that all those circumstances which 
accident and custom have annexed to it are likewise sacred. 
Marriage is sacred, but iniquitous laws, by making it a compact 
of slavery, by imposing impracticable conditions and extorting 
impious promises have, in most countries, converted it into 
something flagitious and hateful. (6: 57) 
Following a particularly distasteful portrait of marriage, Mrs. Carter proffers 
a viable option to what might be construed as an intolerable situation: uncontested 
divorce, an option that oddly enough directly repeats the sentiments Godwin 
champions in Political Justice', in fact, she appropriates his phrase "groundless 
and obstinate attachment" in her argument to underscore this isolated (and 
perhaps perceived as uncharacteristic) alignment with Godwinian philosophy. 
The dialogue concludes with Mrs. Carter's refutation of Godwinian philoso-
phy based on a Wollstonecraftian definition of marriage.12 "Marriage is an union 
founded on free and mutual consent. It cannot exist without friendship. As soon 
as the union ceases to be spontaneous it ceases to be just" (6: 67). 
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Thus the dialogue concludes with a reaffirmation of the established order. 
Alcuin teacher/ersatz philosopher turned pupil/visionary has completed the 
course. Mrs. Carter's apologia on the institution of marriage and the viability of 
divorce in a society that, for the most part, disenfranchised women, remains true 
to Wollstonecraft's ideals—and anticipates Godwin's own shift in political 
stance. Alcuin, the supporter of the early Godwin, has investigated (through the 
implication that he has read Political Justice and, more importantly, with his 
dialectic with Mrs. Carter) the more extreme views advocated by radical thinkers 
regarding the woman question. Mrs. Carter's final comments provide closure on 
the debate, especially in conjunction with the subject of marriage: "If I were to talk 
for months, I could add nothing to the completeness of this definition" (6: 67). 
Her apparent retrenchment (that is, her espousing of the established order) at 
the end may appear paradoxical. But because she is the spokesperson in the 
dialogue, her reversal is perhaps evidence of an encroaching conservatism in 
Brown's thought. Certainly, it is endemic to the socio-political climate of 
Federalist America. More likely, it reflects Brown's own ambivalence regarding 
the woman question, an ambivalence precipitated by the escalating debate 
between conservatives and liberals. 
Indeed, Alcuin is fraught with contradictions and disjunctions that may 
appear to be troublesome and inconsistent. But if we view the text in the context 
of the cultural debate in late eighteenth-century America, we can see that this 
early work does afford a testing ground of ideas. In Alcuin Brown is examining 
and questioning the validity of Godwin's more radical ideas while still offering 
support for women's rights. As in a cultural debate, many voices are heard, many 
are silenced, many are debated. Here the voices are reduced to two, but two voices 
that endorse equality and suffrage, and thereby reflect a modification of what was 
viewed as unchecked radicalism. 
Notes 
1. Alcuin: A Dialogue, ed. Lee R. Edwards (New York, 1971). It is no coincidence that the 
publication of the complete text occurred in the wake of resurgence of the women's movement of the 
1960s and 1970s and the early stages of review of the American literary canon. (I would characterize 
the canon prior to this time as exclusionary, traditionally devaluing or neglecting works grounds of 
gender, race, ethnicity, religion, genre, and theme. An obscure eighteenth-century dialogue on 
women's rights written by a novelist known for his gothic novels would have, prior to this date, been 
regarded as an historical curiosity at best.) 
2. Robert D. Arner, in the Historical Essay to the Bicentennial Edition (274-276), places the 
composition of the first half of Alcuin at this early date based on Brown's propensity for incorporating 
contemporary events and personages in his works. The references to Carnot and Peter Porcupine (who 
were both subject to political debate in late 1796), the indirect allusion to Thomas Young (who was 
awarded the Doctorate in Physics in July 1796), and Elihu Smith's declaration in the 1798 
Advertisement to Alcuin that the "following Dialogue was put into my hands, the last spring [1797], 
by a friend who resides at a distance, with liberty to make it public" (quoted in Arner, 276) support 
the hypothesis of the earlier date. 
3. Alcuin; A Dialogue (New York, 1798). 
4. Arner conjectures that Parts m and IV were composed between August-September 1797 
and April 1798 (277-278). The April end date would be in keeping with the text's reflection of the 
turbulent political mood of the time, especially the public reaction to the disclosure of the XYZ affair. 
5. Within the next year, American society would become extremely hostile to Godwin's ideas, 
primarily because of the furor that surrounded his publishing of his late wife's memoirs, Memoirs of 
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Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin, Author of "A Vindication of the Rights of Woman" (1799), which 
included a detailed account of Wollstonecraft's affairs with a married painter, Henry Fuseli, and an 
American writer, Gilbert Imlay, who was the father of her illegitimate daughter, Fanny Imlay. After 
Imlay spurned Wollstonecraft, she attempted suicide. Soon afterwards she entered a relationship with 
Godwin, resulting in the conception of another daughter, Mary. Her subsequent marriage to Godwin, 
the birth of their daughter, and Wollstonecraft's untimely death eleven days later are carefully 
recounted by the grieving husband in his introduction to her memoirs. 
Subsequently, Wollstonecraftism and Godwinism became synonyms for depravity. Memoirs 
led to the widespread denunciation of Wollstonecraft's views. In fact, the majority of philosophers 
and writers on both sides of the Atlantic were quick to disassociate themselves from feminist issues, 
fearing guilt by association with the discredited champion of women's rights (Davidson, 73). Almost 
immediately an American conservative faction effectively used Godwin's book to defeat the liberal 
principles espoused by the English philosopher and his late wife by proposing that Memoirs 
demonstrated that freedom for women would free their passions, not their reason; that such unchecked 
passion led to destruction; and that those, such as Wollstonecraft and Godwin, who held liberal views 
were without morals or sense. 
6. On a personal level, Godwin himself accepted and embraced the institution of marriage— 
albeit under stipulated conditions. In the second edition of Memoirs (1799), he offers an astute 
observation and explanation for his retrenchment: 
Ideas which I am now willing to denominate prejudices, made me by no means 
eager to conform to a ceremony as an individual, which, coupled with the 
conditions our laws annex to it, I should undoubtedly, as a citizen be desirous 
to abolish. Fuller examination however has taught me to rank this [his marriage 
to Wollstonecraft] among those cases, where an accurate morality will direct 
us to comply with customs and institutions, which, if we had had a voice in their 
introduction, it would have been incumbent on us to negative. (101, n. 9) 
7. Furthermore, this lucid paradigm foreshadows another issue Brown will tacitly raise in 
another work: slavery. In Wieland (1798) the Wieland family fortune is founded on the acquisition 
and the utilization of slaves. One might question the long-term effects of establishing the economic 
base of a family (a government?) on an evil institution. The Wieland family is all but annihilated, its 
psychologically scarred survivors retreat to the Old World and its corrupt values, forsaking the 
opportunities the New World might offer. In the novel, reliance upon and opportunistic acquisition 
of slaves and slavery—and all the evil it embodies—lead to destruction. But in the dialogue between 
Mrs. Carter and Alcuin, Brown succinctly draws parallels between the slavery and women's suffrage 
issues. 
8. Lazare Nicholas Marguerite Carnot (1753-1823) was a leading force on the Directory, the 
executive power in France during the French Revolutionary years of 1795-1799. Carnot's "edict" was 
to Citizen Pierre Adet, the French minister to the United States, instructing him to reproach the 
Washington Administration for its stance toward the Jay Treaty and Washington's position that he 
enunciated in his Farewell Address. 
Peter Porcupine was the nom de plume of William Cobbett (1763-1835), an English journalist 
who published a series of anti-republican pamphlets and a pro-British, Federalist newspaper, 
Porcupine's Gazette and Daily Advertizer ( 1797-1799), in Philadelphia. Among his more well-known 
works are A Bone to Gnaw on for the Democrats (1795), A Kick for Bite (1796), and the slanderous 
Life of Tom Paine ( 1796). (The last work especially alludes to the error in Alcuin's judgment, as Paine 
was an articulate and very vocal proponent of women's rights.) 
9. Europeans during this time often tried to shame Americans by asserting that they had 
produced no geniuses. Jefferson and others used the same logic Alcuin employs here to refute such 
charges. 
10. Nancy Rice explores Brown's aversion to the practice of law, citing as a cause for such 
aversion his unhappy apprenticeship with Alexander Wilcocks. She states that Brown's law-reading 
experience had convinced him that money—and hypocrisy—could purchase justice, an odious 
concept for the young novelist (803). 
Furthermore, Jay Fliegelman has compiled selections from Brown's writings that clearly stress 
the novelist's view of barristers. (Unfortunately, Fliegelman does not offer bibliographic information 
regarding these citations.) For example, in an autobiographical epistolary romance serialized in 
Weekly Magazine, Brown characterizes lawyers as those who compose "subtleties and sophisms 
calculated to mislead the consciousness of justice implanted in every human being" (quoted in 
Fliegelman, xiv). In a private letter, Brown employs even stronger language, declaring that by "legal 
robbery" the lawyer denies "the widow and the orphan of their just and righteous claims through.. 
. supreme artifice and eloquence" (quoted in Fliegelman, xiv). 
11. Davidson notes that Godwin later modified his view toward marriage. Thus, Alcuin 
represents the younger and more radical Godwin (85, n. 22). 
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12. This definition is derived from Vindication and the 1787 work, Thoughts on the Education 
of Daughters (Davidson 85, n.26). 
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